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V. Trans-Pacific strategic economic partnership agreement:
High standard or missed opportunity?
By Henry Gao
Introduction
Since its inception in 2005, the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement (P4 Agreement) has enjoyed great attention and has been referred to by many
commentators as a “high-standard” free trade agreement (FTA).1  There is, in fact, no official
definition of what constitutes a “high standard” FTA; however, since the central purpose of
FTAs is to reduce trade barriers and promote trade liberalization, the degree of trade
liberalization should be used as the basis for judging whether the “standard” of an FTA is
“high” or not. To be more specific, in line with the requirements under General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XXIV and General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
Article V, a “high standard” FTA should satisfy the following requirements:
(a) With regard to trade in goods, coverage of substantially all the trade between
the parties, and elimination of duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce on such trade;
(b) With regard to trade in services, a substantial sectoral coverage, and an
absence or the elimination of substantially all discrimination in national
treatment in the sectors covered.
In addition, since a claim for “high standard” obviously involves some element of
comparison, the P4 Agreement should also provide for trade liberalization opportunities and
rules restricting trade protection better than:
(a) Those provided for under the WTO Agreements;
(b) Those provided for under other agreements concluded between other WTO
members who are not parties to the P4 Agreement;
(c) Those provided for under the other agreements concluded between the parties
to the P4 Agreement and non-members to the P4 Agreement;
(d) Those provided for under the pre-existing agreements concluded between the
members of the P4 Agreement themselves before the P4 Agreement was
concluded.
1 See, for example: Ministry of Trade and Industry of Singapore Media Info-note on the P4
Agreement, 18 July 2005; and the Statement of United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab on
the launch of the United States negotiations to join the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement, 22 September 2008, available online at www.ustr.gov/schwab-statement-launch-us-
negotiations-join-trans-pacific-strategic-economic-partnership-agreement.
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The following sections review the main components of the P4 Agreement and
compare them with those of other agreements in order to assess whether the former
actually lives up to its reputation of being a “high standard” FTA.
A.  Market access for goods
As FTAs have traditionally been viewed as a tool for dismantling tariff barriers, the
reduction and elimination of tariffs on goods have been regarded as a key benchmark for
measuring trade liberalization under an FTA. The emphasis on tariff reduction is reflected in
GATT Article XXIV, which notes that an FTA will “eliminate tariffs” on “substantially all the
trade” between the constituent members of an FTA. There are two components to this
requirement.
The first component is a high coverage of the goods traded. There has been much
debate on the exact meaning of “substantially all the trade”, for example, whether:
(a) It demands a qualitative approach (no exclusion of major sectors) or
a quantitative approach (a minimum numerical benchmark for the trade
volume covered);
(b) The percentage is measures by tariff lines or the actual trade volume;
(c) The trade includes actual trade only or potential trade as well;
(d) The percentage will be measured in terms of the total trade of all the members
combined or merely the separate exports and imports of each member on an
individual basis or both. So far, the only body that can give an official
interpretation of the term; WTO has not been able to articulate clear
guidelines, largely due to the difficulties created by the consensus-based,
decision-making rule. In practice, most FTAs around the world have chosen to
adopt a quantitative approach, which is usually set at no less than 90 per cent
of the actual trade between the members.
Second, the duties will be “eliminated” on the trade covered. The choice of the word
“eliminate” rather than “reduce” means that what is required is zero tariffs, rather than low
tariffs. Thus, legally speaking, even an FTA that reduces all tariffs from 100 per cent to
0.01 per cent ad valorem across the board would not satisfy the requirement here as the
tariffs will have not been “eliminated”.
In the case of the P4 Agreement, the tariff reductions in the following countries are:
(a) Singapore – almost all imports already enjoy duty-free treatment. The only
exceptions are alcoholic drinks such as stout, porter, beer and ale, which are
subject to a duty of S$ 16 per litre, and samsu (rice-wine), which is subject to
a duty of S$ 8 per litre.2  Upon the conclusion of the P4 Agreement, Singapore
agreed to eliminate these duties with immediate effect, bringing tariffs on all
imports to zero;
2 List of Dutiable Goods, available at www.customs.gov.sg/leftNav/trad/List+of+Dutiable+Goods.htm.
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(b) Brunei Darussalam – imports from Singapore already enjoy the preferences
under the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), which provided for the reduction of
99 per cent of the tariffs to 0-5 per cent by 20023  and the total elimination of all
tariffs by 2010.4  At the same time, Brunei Darussalam applied zero tariffs on
92 per cent of the imports from New Zealand prior to the conclusion of the
P4 Agreement. Brunei Darussalam agreed to bind the tariffs for these products
at zero upon the entry into force of the P4 Agreement. The remaining tariffs
would be eliminated according to the following schedule: (i) duties on forestry
products, which account for 1.79 per cent of the imports from New Zealand,
were to be eliminated by 1 January 2010; (ii) duties on certain machinery
products, which account for 1.19 per cent of the imports from New Zealand,
will be eliminated by 1 January 2012; and (iii) duties on vehicle and vehicle
parts, rubber articles as well as the other machinery products, which account
for 5.29 per cent of the imports from Chile, will be eliminated by 1 January
2015. Brunei Darussalam excludes products such as alcohol, tobacco and
firearms from its tariff elimination schedule for moral, human health and
security reasons;
(c) New Zealand – imports from Singapore already enter the country duty-free as
the result of the New Zealand-Singapore Closer Economic Partnership.
Similarly, 99 per cent of the imports from Brunei Darussalam (mostly oil) and
67 per cent of the imports from Chile also enjoyed zero tariffs even before the
conclusion of the P4 Agreement. On 1 May 2006, New Zealand had to remove
tariffs on another 29 per cent of the imports from Chile. The remaining tariffs
would be eliminated according to the following schedule: (i) duties on
jewellery, ceramics and skincare products, which account for 0.03 per cent of
the imports from Chile, were to be eliminated by 1 January 2008; (ii) duties on
whiteware and aluminium products, which account for 1.54 per cent of the
imports from Chile, were to be eliminated by 1 January 2010; (iii) duties on
textiles, apparel, footwear and carpet products, which account for 1.92 per
cent of the imports from Chile, will be eliminated by 1 January 2015;
(d) Chile – 89.3 per cent of the imports from New Zealand and Singapore were
to receive duty-free treatment when the Agreement came into force on
8 November 2006. The remaining tariffs would be eliminated as follows: (i) for
Singapore, duties on 9.57 per cent of the imports within the following three
years, and the remaining imports within the following six years;5  (ii) for New
Zealand, most of the tariffs will be eliminated by 1 January 2015, with tariffs on
Chile’s most sensitive dairy products – butter, milk powder and whey – which
account for 9.26 per cent of the imports from New Zealand to be eliminated on
1 January 2017.
3 See ASEAN Free Trade Area: An Update at www.aseansec.org/7665.htm.
4 Protocol to Amend the Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for
the ASEAN Free Trade Area for the Elimination of Import Duties, 31 January 2003. Available at
www.aseansec.org/14183.htm.
5 See www.fta.gov.sg/fta_tpfta.asp?hl=12.
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Now compare the above tariff reduction schedules provided for under the P4
Agreement, with those under the other agreements. Of the four countries, Singapore has
long maintained a zero-tariff policy on all imports except alcoholic beverages and tobacco
products. As the result, 99 per cent of all imports enter Singapore duty-free. Thus, even
though Singapore has concluded FTAs with countries in many parts of the world, it does not
make much sense to compare Singapore’s tariffs under the P4 Agreement with those under
other agreements. On the other hand, Brunei Darussalam has only a very small trade
volume and most of its trade is with Singapore. Moreover, other than the P4 Agreement,
Brunei Darussalam only has one FTA – the EPA with Japan – that was not concluded as
part of the collective FTA initiative by ASEAN. Thus, comparing the P4 Agreement with
Brunei Darussalam’s other FTAs is also unlikely to yield meaningful results. Therefore, the
focus is on New Zealand and Chile (more so on Chile as the trade regime of New Zealand is
in general already very liberal), which have similar trade volumes and trade-to-GDP ratios,
a more diversified trade pattern and are parties to a wider range of FTAs in addition to the
P4 Agreement.
First, consider the coverage of tariff lines and actual trade. Generally, the broader
the coverage, the more liberal is the agreement. The P4 Agreement covers 100 per cent of
the imports of Chile and New Zealand. While this compares favourably against the FTAs
that Chile signed pre-P4, such as the Canada-Chile Free Trade Agreement (CCFTA), which
excludes dairy products, it is the same as the post-P4 FTAs, such as the one with Australia.
The next factor is the depth of initial tariff reduction. The more liberal FTAs would
usually include a higher percentage of duty-free products when such agreements enter into
force. Under P4, only 89.3 per cent of the imports from New Zealand and Singapore
enjoyed zero tariffs when the Agreement entered into force. While this is higher than under
CCFTA, which liberalized only 75 per cent of the trade upon initial implementation,6  it is
lower than the one provided for under the FTA with Australia, which was 96.9 per cent of the
trade from Australia upon entry into force.7
The third factor is the length of the phase-in period for the remaining tariff
eliminations. The shorter the time frame, the more liberal the agreement. The P4 Agreement
allows Chile 10 years to implement the duty-free obligations on dairy products from New
Zealand. Again this is shorter than CCFTA (15+ years for milling wheat, sugar and beef) but
longer than the FTA with Australia (six years).
The last factor is the real economic impact of the Agreement. The higher the real
economic impact, the more liberal is the agreement. While it is always difficult to measure
the economic impact of an FTA accurately, a proximate substitute would be the amount of
tariffs saved, which can be estimated by multiplying the amount of trade covered with the
difference between the MFN tariff rate and FTA tariff rate. The MFN tariff rates of the four
countries are all quite low; calculated on a trade-weighted average basis, the rates in 2006
6 See www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-dpci/ag-ac/4957-eng.htm.
7 Australia-Chile Free Trade Agreement, Summary of Key Obligations, Available at www.dfat.gov.au/
GEO/chile/fta/FTA_key_obligations.html.
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were 5.1 per cent for Brunei Darussalam, 6 per cent for Chile, 3.5 per cent for New Zealand,
and zero per cent for Singapore.8  Combined with the low trade volume of all countries
(except Singapore, which already enjoys duty-free treatment on most of its exports to the
other three countries), the tariff savings are insignificant. For example, based on the 2004
trade figures, New Zealand estimated that the P4 Agreement would only result in savings of
NZ$ 2.2 million on its exports to Chile9  and NZ$ 52,000 on its exports to Brunei
Darussalam,10  while New Zealand will end up with duties foregone of NZ$ 300,000 from
Chile11  and NZ$ 1,800 from Brunei Darussalam.12  Even if it is assumed that the conclusion
of the Agreement will generate 100 per cent more trade between the parties, the economic
impacts seem to be insignificant. Indeed, exports from New Zealand to Chile only increased
from NZ$ 36.6 million in 200413  to NZ$ 44.9 million in 200814  while the imports contracted
from NZ$ 26.1 million in 200415  to NZ$ 21.6 million in 2008,16  and any future economic
impact of the agreement would probably also be negligible.
B.  Rules of origin
The classic justification for Rules of Origin (ROO) is to prevent free-riders, i.e., those
non-members of an FTA that evade tariffs by trans-shipping their products from a low MFN-
tariff FTA member to a member with higher MFN tariffs. Overly-restrictive ROO, however,
can constitute undue barriers to trade between FTA members and non-members, reducing
the potential for trade between the two. As one of the original intentions of the P4
Agreement was to entice other countries to join, it adopted a more liberal ROO regime.
In general, ROO regimes include two dimensions: (a) sectoral, product-specific
ROOs; and (b) general, regime-wide ROOs. In terms of product-specific ROOs, there are
two basic criteria to determine origin: (a) wholly obtained or produced; and (b) substantial
transformation. Substantial transformation, in turn, includes three main components that can
be used either alone or together: (a) change in tariff classification (CTC); (b) value content
(VC); or (c) technical requirement.
8 WTO Tariff Profiles. Available at http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFView.aspx?
Language=E&Country=BN,CL,NZ,SG.
9 New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership
Agreement National Interest Analysis, July 2005; p. 15.
10 Ibid., p. 16.
11 Ibid., p. 47.
12 Ibid., p. 48.
13 lbid., p. 15.
14 See www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Latin-America/Chile.php.
15 WTO Secretariat report on the P4 Agreement.
16 See www.mfat.govt.nz/Countries/Latin-America/Chile.php.
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According to Article 4.2 of the P4 Agreement, a good is considered as originating
from the members if one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(a) The good is wholly obtained or produced entirely in the territory of one party,
pursuant to the definition in Article 4.1;
(b) The good is produced entirely in the territory of one or more parties,
exclusively from materials whose origin conforms to the provisions of this
Chapter; or
(c) The good is produced in the territory of one or more parties, using non-
originating materials that conform to a change in tariff classification, a regional
value content, or other requirements specified in Annex II, and the good meets
the other applicable provisions of this Chapter.”
Of these three criteria, the first two are quite straightforward as they involve only
parties to the Agreement. The last requirement, however, is much more complicated. The
main text of the Agreement does not provide for a single set of rules. Instead, Annex II of the
Agreement lists the detailed rules that each product has to meet to be considered as a good
originating from the members. These include all three components of the substantial
transformation test: For most goods, CTC applies and may require a change of either HS
chapter (CC), HS heading (CTH) or HS subheading (CTSH). The corresponding rules are
listed either at the HS heading (4-digit) or HS subheadings (6-digit) levels.
Many products also include a regional value content (RVC) test as an alternative
rule to the CTC criterion. Under this test, the relevant CTC rules will not apply if the RVC of
a product or the originating materials constitute a minimum percentage in the overall FOB
value of the product. The default RVC is 45 per cent, except for textiles, clothing and
footwear products for which it has been raised to 50 per cent. Finally, goods falling under
Chapters 15 (animal or vegetable fats and oils products) and 27 to 40 (mineral, chemical
and plastic products) are subject to technical requirement rules.
While a high RVC requirement can guarantee that only goods genuinely originating
from members are eligible for RTA tariff savings, it also impedes trade flow from non-
members and can sometimes even deny the benefits for products that would have been
treated as originating goods under a regime with lower RVC requirements. Thus, the higher
an RVC requirement, the more restrictive the Agreement. As noted by Estevadeordal, Harris
and Suominen (2009), the 45 per cent to 50 per cent RVC under the P4 Agreement is higher
(more restrictive) than two-thirds of all the 70+ agreements examined.
Another indicator of the restrictiveness of a ROO regime is cumulation (or
accumulation) rules, which allow an RTA member to use materials from another country
without losing the preferential status of the final product. The more restrictive ROOs tend to
include only the possibility for bilateral cumulation, i.e., only goods or materials originating in
an RTA member may be considered in determining the origin of the final product. The more
liberal ROOs, on the other hand, also include extended cumulation, where the inputs from
non-members may also count in the origin determination of the final product.
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The P4 Agreement provides for bilateral cumulation under Article 4.5, but extended
cumulation is not allowed. To a certain extent, this rather harsh rule is softened slightly by
the exception in Article 4.12 allowing outward processing, whereby products undergoing
processing in a non-party prior to final manufacture in a party will be considered as
originating, provided that the total value of non-originating materials does not exceed 55 per
cent of the customs value of the final good. However, this exception has only a minor impact
as it applies to just a small set of products, listed in Annex 4.B of the P4 Agreement, that
includes mostly machinery and appliance products.
The third indicator is the de minimus rule, which allows goods that do not conform to
the CTC rules to be treated as originating if the value of non-originating materials does not
exceed a maximum percentage of the value of the final product. Article 4.6 of the P4
Agreement provides for a 10 per cent de minimus rule. This is higher than the rules under
most other FTAs and is quite liberal.
The last factor to be considered is the complexity of the ROO regime, also referred
to as sectoral selectivity in ROOs, which measures the number and types of ROOs in FTAs.
Those with a larger number and type of ROO are more complex than those with
a smaller number or even one type of ROO. While complexity does not necessarily translate
into restrictiveness, more complex regimes typically would raise the cost of compliance, and
inhibit rather than encourage trade flows. According to Estevadeordal, Harris and Suominen
(2009), the P4 Agreement is among the most complex FTAs, and is more complex than
more than two-third, of the FTAs studied.
C.  Non-tariff barriers
In addition to the elimination of duties, Article XXIV.8(b) also requires FTAs to
eliminate “other restrictive regulations of commerce” (ORRC). The exact scope of this term,
like the vaguely-worded “substantially all trade”, also remains largely an unsolved mystery.
Granted, the term tells us two things. First, ORRC does not include tariffs, which obviously
would be covered by the word “duties” in the same sentence. Second, what matters most is
not the form of the regulation, but its effect on commerce. As long as a regulation has
a “restrictive” effect on trade, it could be potentially covered by ORRC. Beyond this,
however, we enter uncharted waters. To start with, all regulations, be it border measures or
those regulating the domestic market, invariably affect trade to a certain extent and can be
deemed as “restricting” commerce. Does this mean that they are all ORRC? It would be
ridiculous to think that Article XXIV.8(b) would cast such a wide net. Of all the non-tariff
measures that are covered by WTO (such as TBT measures, SPS measures and trade
remedy measures), which ones are covered and which ones are not? Of these, the most
difficult question arises from the inclusion of trade remedy measures, i.e., antidumping,
subsidy-countervailing and safeguard measures. This raises the following issues.
First, are they “regulations of commerce”? The answer seems obvious as the
initiation and conduct of various trade remedy investigations are usually governed by
regulations. However, because the final measures usually take the form of additional duties
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imposed on imports and such duties are of the same form as the normal customs duties, it
could be argued that they fall under “duties” rather than ORRC.
Second, even if for the sake of argument we assume that they are “regulations of
commerce”, are they of a “restrictive” nature? Again this question appears to be easily
answered – don’t all trade remedy measures restrict trade by imposing additional burdens
on imports? Further reflection reveals, however, that this question is not as simple as it first
appears. To the extent that antidumping and subsidy-countervailing measures are supposed
to address “unfair trade”, they do not restrict but instead facilitate “proper trade” by
supposedly removing the distortions created by such unfair trade practices. In addition, even
safeguard measures serve a useful purpose by providing a safety valve to deal with the
temporary difficulties created by a sudden rise of imports; without such an escape clause,
the entire free trade agreement might never be approved by the legislature and no
additional trade could be generated. In other words, while trade remedy measures might
appear to restrict trade, their ultimate purpose is to facilitate trade, and thus should not be
condemned.
Third, even assuming that the trade remedy measures are “restrictive regulations of
commerce”, does the requirement of elimination of ORRC mean that trade remedy
measures must be banned in FTAs? Consider the following two scenarios: one is an FTA
that bans the application of trade remedy measures between members, but allows the
application towards non-FTA members; the other scenario is an FTA that allows the
application of trade remedy measures to both members and non-members. Which scenario
is in line with the requirement to “eliminate” ORRC? To answer this question, we first have to
deal with another question, i.e., to the extent that the meaning of ORRC embodies the
consideration of the trade-restrictive effect of a measure, should we consider the effect of
the measure on trade among members only, or on trade between members and non-
members as well? In the author’s view – to the extent that in the same paragraph ORRC
precedes the clause “on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in
products originating in such territories” – it means that only the effect on intra-FTA trade will
be considered. Thus, because trade remedy measures – if allowed between members –
would create trade-restrictive effect on members, they should be eliminated accordingly.
In reality, however, many FTAs, including the P4 Agreement, do allow the application
of trade remedy measures among members. Do they all violate the requirement of the
elimination of ORRC? No, not as such. The above analysis is incomplete as it ignores the
exception contained in parentheses in the same sentence that allows the continued
application of ORRCs “permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX” even after the
formation of an FTA. Again, however, the list of exceptions has been subject to contradicting
interpretations. One view is that the list is exhaustive, i.e., only those Articles that are listed
might be cited as a way to avoid the general obligation to eliminate ORRCs. Because the
provisions authorizing the trade remedy measures – Articles VI and XIX – are not in the list,
they will not be included in the exceptions, which means that they must be eliminated in an
FTA. The other approach, however, treats the list as illustrative, i.e., it also includes implicitly
similar provisions that are not explicitly mentioned. For example, the security exceptions
clause under Article XXI is not listed here. However, because its twin clause under
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Article XX is included, surely Article XXI should also be included. It would be absurd if
countries are allowed to impose trade restrictions upon the breakout of a serious pandemic
but not a major war – national security considerations are definitely more important than
public health concerns.
To summarize the above discussion, it is unclear whether trade remedy measures
among members are eliminated upon the formation of an FTA. However, one fact is clear:
these measures, if allowed among members, have a restrictive effect on intra-FTA trade.
Thus, a “high-standard” FTA that aims to facilitate greater trade liberalization among
members will eliminate, or at least restrict, the use of trade remedy measures.
Unfortunately, in this regard, the P4 Agreement again fails to live up to its reputation. First,
as a general matter, the Agreement allows a member to adopt non-tariff measures either
“in accordance with its rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement” or “in accordance
with other provisions of this Agreement.”17  This could be interpreted to mean that even
measures that are inconsistent with WTO rules could be maintained as long as that is
allowed by the Agreement. 32. In particular, the Agreement allows Chile to maintain the
following measures: (a), a price band system for various edible vegetable oils, sugar, wheat
and wheat flour;18  (b), a quantity-based safeguard for certain dairy products during the
phase-in period for the tariff liberalization on these products;19  and (c) measures related to
imports of used vehicles.20
Second, in terms of the generic trade remedy measures, the P4 Agreement provides
that the members retain their “the rights and obligations” under the WTO Agreements on
Safeguards, Antidumping, and Subsidy and Countervailing Measures, as well as GATT
Articles XIX and VI. Moreover, the Agreement explicitly provides that the members get no
“additional rights or obligations” with regard to trade remedy measures taken pursuant to
these WTO Agreements. This means that members may simply apply safeguard measures
as was done before the conclusion of the FTA. The investigating member faces no more
restrictions than the ones provided for under the WTO Agreements, while the member under
investigation cannot claim better treatment than that accorded to non-members.
This is a rather disappointing outcome and compares unfavourably with other FTAs.
As noted by Teh, Prusa and Budetta (2007), a large number of FTAs have adopted
RTA-specific rules that tighten discipline on the application of trade remedies on RTA
members, with some even abolishing certain trade remedy measures. These include some
of the FTAs signed by the members of the P4 Agreement. For example, Singapore and New
17 Article 3.8.
18 Article 3.12. In October 2000, Argentina challenged Chile’s price band system in WTO. The
Appellate Body ruled in its report of September 2002 that the price band system was inconsistent with
Article 4.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture. In November 2001, Chile amended Article 12 of Law
No. 18.525 so that maximum applied rates resulting from the application of the price band system were
no more than its bound rates in WTO. However, this means that the rates may still be higher than the
zero tariffs provided for under the P4 Agreement.
19 Article 3.13.
20 Annex 3.A.
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Zealand agreed in ANZSCEP to tighten the thresholds for the commencement and
application of antidumping investigations by raising the de minimis dumping margin from
2 per cent to 5 per cent, and the margin of negligible imports from 3 per cent to 5 per cent.21
The Canada-Chile FTA, EFTA-Chile FTA and EFTA-Singapore FTA banned
antidumping measures, while Singapore agreed to prohibit safeguard measures in its FTAs
with Australia and New Zealand. As many of these more liberal FTAs were concluded before
the P4 Agreement, the question is why the members have not chosen to consolidate the
more liberal approach that they have agreed to in the other FTAs into the P4 Agreement,
and to make it a trade-remedy-free agreement. Indeed, even though such a move might be
considered a bold one, it could be argued that the negotiation for the P4 Agreement
provided the most opportune occasion for such action. On the one hand, of the four parties,
Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand rarely apply any trade remedy measures
against any country; Chile has made use of these measures against other countries, yet it
has rarely used them against Singapore, Brunei Darussalam and New Zealand.22  On the
other hand, given the small trade volume between the parties, it is much less costly for the
members to abolish trade remedy, a move to which there should be little resistance.
Unfortunately, the P4 Agreement failed to seize the opportunity.
D.  Opening up the services market
According to GATS Article V, an Economic Integration Agreement for services will
satisfy the following conditions:
(a) Substantial sectoral coverage, and
(b) Provision for the absence or elimination of substantially all discrimination, in
the sense of Article XVII, between or among the parties, in the sectors covered
under subparagraph (a), through the (i) elimination of existing discriminatory
measures, and/or (ii) prohibition of new or more discriminatory measures.
Article V requirements are similar to the requirements under Article XXIV to
“eliminate duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all the
trade”. The similarity in the wording, however, also means that the Article V requirements
suffer from the same interpretative problems. First, “substantial sectoral coverage” is rather
vague. While a footnote to the Article provides some clarification by stating that the factors
to be considered in evaluating the coverage of an Economic Integration Agreement include
“number of sectors, volume of trade affected and modes of supply”, it still does not provide
a clear numerical benchmark and leaves many important questions unanswered:
21 Article 9. This has been inherited by the P4 Agreement, but only applies to bilateral trade between
New Zealand and Singapore.
22 For an overview of Chile’s antidumping and safeguard measures from 1981 to 2002, see Sáez,
2005.
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(a) What is the exact meaning of the word “substantial”? Is it close to
“substantially all”, meaning close to 100 per cent, or does it refer to somewhat
significant, meaning that more than 50 per cent would suffice? Or could it even
include less than 50 per cent?
(b) For the number of sectors, should only the 12 broad sectors be considered, or
should the more than 160 sectors listed in the Services Sectoral Classification
List also be considered?23
(c) Does the “volume of trade” refer to the value of the trade, or the number of
services transactions, or number of services suppliers or customers?
(d) In terms of modes of supply, the same footnote states that an agreement “shall
not provide for the a priori exclusion of any mode of supply”. Does that mean
all four modes must be listed in every sector or subsector that is included in
the schedule? Even if all four modes are included, can a party inscribe
“unbound” in any mode? Is it acceptable if a schedule only includes horizontal
commitments on a mode while offering no sector-specific commitments on the
mode?
The same interpretive difficulties also arise from the requirement for “elimination of
substantially all discrimination”. While the text of the Article states that the discriminations
will be those regulated by Article XVII, i.e., only national treatment discriminations, and not
market access or MFN discriminations, it still leaves many gaps wide open:
(a) Does this requirement apply to all the sectors covered in the schedule?
(b) Does it apply to all four modes?
(c) Should the word “substantially all” be understood in terms of the number of
discriminatory measures or should the volume or value of trade affected by
individual measures also be taken into account?
d) When considering the effect on trade should such consideration only cover
existing trade, or should any potential trade that could arise from the
elimination of certain measures also be considered?
While these questions are very important, it is obviously beyond the scope of this
chapter to provide the answers. Instead, as stated above, the purpose of the study
described here was to evaluate the claim that the P4 Agreement was a “high standard” free
trade agreement. For that purpose, it was only necessary to compare the P4 Agreement to
other FTAs and Economic Integration Agreements in terms of whether it was a better or
worse deal. In other words, there was no need to find out exactly how much the P4
Agreement was worth. While referring to hard trade figures (as in the trade in goods section
above) provides the most reliable way of comparison, that was not possible in the current
study as services trade flows are notoriously difficult to capture and all the data available so
far are at best “guestimates”. Fortunately, however, comparing trade numbers is not the only
approach available. So long as the same methodology is used to evaluate the degree of
23 MTN.GNS/W/120, 10 July 1991.
90
trade liberalization of different agreements, it is possible to gain reasonable idea of the
extent of openness in different agreements. The study detailed in this chapter adopted the
methodology used by Fink and Molinuevo (2008) for quantifying services commitments.
That methodology identifies the “value added” of FTAs for each of the 154 sub-sectors and
four modes of supply by classifying the resulting 616 entries per FTA schedule into the
following four categories:
(a) Sub-sectors and modes for which only a GATS commitment exists or an FTA
does not offer any improvement (GATS only);
(b) Sub-sectors and modes for which a partial GATS commitment exists and an
FTA eliminates one or more remaining trade-restrictive measures (FTA
improvements);
(c) Sub-sectors and modes for which no GATS commitment is available, but an
FTA commitment is made (FTA new sectors);
(d) Sub-sectors and modes for which neither a GATS nor an FTA commitment
exists (Unbound).
Categories (a), (b), and (c) are further divided into partial and full commitments, with
the latter defined as not listing any remaining trade-restrictive measures.
When the P4 Agreement was initially signed by the four members, only Singapore,
Chile and New Zealand made commitments on services. According to Article 20.5 of the
Agreement, Brunei Darussalam was to submit its services schedule for acceptance by the
other parties within two years upon the Agreement’s entry into force. Prior to that, Brunei
Darussalam could not benefit from the services commitments offered by the other three
members. As the Agreement entered into force for Brunei Darussalam on 12 July 2006, the
decision was supposed to be made by 12 July 2008. However, nothing has happened so far.
This means that Brunei Darussalam’s services trade with the other three parties is still
wholly excluded from the Agreement. Because of the low level of Brunei Darussalam’s
services trade,24  trade in the sector between Brunei Darussalam and the other three
members is probably very small; however, the fact that the services sector of one member
has been excluded still casts some doubt on whether the “substantial sectoral coverage”
requirement has been fulfilled.
Outwardly, the services commitments made by the three remaining countries appear
to be quite liberal as the Agreement adopts a “negative list” approach in scheduling the
commitments, meaning that obligations on national treatment, MFN and market access
apply to all covered sectors in all four modes unless otherwise noted.25  However, closer
observation reveals that the commitments are not as broad and deep as might be first
thought.
24 In 2005, Brunei Darussalam’s services trade in the world rankings was 100. This was dwarfed by the
rankings of Chile, New Zealand and Singapore.
25 Article 12.8.
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First, several sectors were excluded from the whole Agreement. Following the
example of GATS, air transport services and services supplied in the exercising of
governmental authority have both been excluded. Moreover, the Agreement also removed
the entire financial services sector from its coverage. Given the importance of that sector,
both on its own and as an infrastructural sector, the exclusion again raises questions
regarding the fulfillment of the “substantial sectoral coverage” requirement.
Second, the obligations only apply to the extent that there are no reservations listed
in Annexes III and IV. Annex III lists the existing non-conforming measures. To some extent
the potential damaging effect of Annex III has been softened slightly by the “ratchet” clause
in Article 12.8:1(c), which provides that a party may only amend an existing non-conforming
measure to make it more liberal, but not more restrictive.
However, the “ratchet” clause could potentially be defeated by Annex IV
reservations, which allows the parties to adopt or maintain new measures that do not
conform to the basic obligations. As all three members made many reservations under both
Annexes, it seems that the “elimination of substantially all discrimination” is also being
evaded.
These worries are confirmed by Fink and Molinuevo (2008), which compares the
levels of liberalization among Singapore’s FTAs. In terms of the width of coverage and depth
of commitments, even though Singapore’s commitments in the P4 Agreement are better
than many of the other FTAs it has signed, there are still some FTAs with higher levels of
liberalization than the P4 Agreement. One notable example is the FTA with the United
States, in which Singapore agreed to higher commitments in the financial services,
recreational, cultural and sporting services, and transport services sectors. Even the FTA
with Jordan features better commitment in the construction and related engineering services
sector, while the commitments in the distribution services and environmental services
sectors are better in the FTA with the Republic of Korea. In terms of the modes of supply,
the FTA with Australia has better commitments in every mode except mode 4, while the
FTAs with the Republic of Korea, the United States and Panama include higher
commitments in all modes.
E.  Conclusion: High standard or missed opportunity?
As the above discussion shows, the trade liberalization provided for under the P4
Agreement is rather modest, sometimes even lower than the commitments made by the
parties themselves in other agreements. On top of this, the existing trade regimes of the
members were already very liberal before the conclusion of the P4 Agreement, and the
trade volume of each member (except Singapore) as well as that between members is
rather small. Thus, it is unlikely that the Agreement will bring significant economic benefits.
Why, then, did the parties negotiate the Agreement in the first place?
In a special lecture delivered at the Victoria University of Wellington in 2005, Chilean
Ambassador to New Zealand Juan Salazar explored the reasons. While Salazar’s talk
focused on the rationale for the Closer Economic Relations Agreement between Chile and
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New Zealand, it was applicable largely to the larger P4 Agreement as well as the other
parties share similar circumstances as the two. According to Salazar, “the Chile-New
Zealand initiative was, from the very beginning, not supposed to be a typical Free Trade
Agreement” that aimed at “increasing bilateral flows of merchandise”. Instead, the parties
really wanted to use the Agreement to build “a larger scheme for a Closer Economic
Partnership” with the following goals:
(a) To act as a benchmark for trade liberalization among APEC economies and
create a demonstration effect for the WTO;
(b) To promote political cooperation between the two countries as they share
similar political philosophies;
(c) To forge potential strategic alliance on a wide array of areas ranging from
agricultural, education to technology.
Of the three objectives, the first is most relevant from the perspective of trade policy
and worth further discussion. According to Salazar, as Chile, New Zealand and Singapore
are all small, open and export-oriented economies, they have to push harder for world trade
liberalization than their larger and less export-dependent countries. When multilateral
negotiations do not move forward, they have to resort to bilateral or regional initiatives to
create more market access opportunities for their exports and, eventually, increase the
momentum for trade liberalization on a wider platform. While the Chile-New Zealand-
Singapore partnership might not have sufficient political clout to have a big impact on the
progress of negotiations at WTO, the P4 Agreement could serve as a stepping-stone for an
expanded “P+” agreement within APEC.
While this analysis appears to be plausible on paper, it is doubtful that the P4
Agreement can really achieve this purpose. In the author’s view, before the P4 Agreement
can become the nucleus of a wider economic integration process, it needs to satisfy three
requirements.
First, at the economic level, the Agreement itself must offer a high level of trade
liberalization. While the existing members of the Agreement might not have put economic
benefits at the top of their list when they entered into the Agreement, other potential
members will not find it worthwhile to join unless they can enjoy substantial economic gains.
However, as indicated above, while the market access opportunities provided for under the
Agreement are quite substantial, they do not always compare favourably against those
under other agreements. Moreover, not only must the existing members conform to such
a “high standard”, they must also be able to hold the new members against the same
standard. As even the existing members – most are considered to be among the most open
economies – did not feel comfortable with offering many real concessions, it is highly
unlikely that new members will be able to follow suit. This raises another question: in the
future expansion of the Agreement, will the priority be placed on getting the largest number
of countries with a lower level of trade liberalization and smaller set of issues covered, or on
achieving the widest coverage of issues and highest level of liberalization with a smaller
group of countries? In the author’s view, since the P4 Agreement strives to build up a “high
standard” agreement for others to follow, the latter approach should be adopted and quality
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should not be sacrificed for the sake of quantity. Otherwise, the Agreement will lose its
credibility and languish into another agreement that is indistinguishable from most of the
preferential trade agreements. Unfortunately, this is probably easier said than done,
especially when considering the eagerness of the current members of the P4 Agreement to
invite other countries to join the pact. However, the members will have to accept this
trade-off if they really want to create something special.
Second, at the political level, the members to the Agreement must find a way to deal
with the pressures from political and economic powers that wish to accede to the
Agreement. As Baldwin, Evenett and Low (2009) observed, “[t]he world of trade negotiations
is governed by something of the law of the jungle, where nations with big markets have
more leverage than those with small markets... The jungle law is much more in evidence
when large countries sit down with small ones [in a regional or bilateral negotiation] than it is
in a WTO context”. Of the four existing members of the Agreement, Chile is the largest in
terms of land area and population. Have the other three members managed to escape the
law of the jungle? Not really. If the commitments made by the four members are compared,
the ones by Chile are generally lower than those of the other members. Also, as discussed
above, there are many exceptions tailor-made just for Chile. It might be argued that the
special treatment for Chile is justified as it is a developing country and has the lowest per
capita GDP among the four countries. However, if the P4 Agreement really wants to set the
“Golden Standard” for FTAs, it will have to hold every country, be it rich or poor, large or
small, to the same standard. If a country is not ready, the members will just have to pass it
over and keep the high standard, rather than letting that country in and diluting the degree of
trade liberalization.
It might also be argued that since Brunei Darussalam, the smallest and weakest
member among the parties, also got away with lower concessions, the fact that Chile’s
concessions are lower than the others does not necessarily mean that Chile has abused its
negotiating power. However, the author would again disagree. Brunei Darussalam is an
entirely different story to that of Chile, as the former country’s market is too small and
insignificant for the other parties. Looking at the negotiating history of the P4 Agreement, it
can see that the talks stopped several times due to the reluctance of Chile. While there
might have been real political difficulties at home, such reluctance on the side of Chile,
coupled with the eagerness on the side of New Zealand, gave Chile more bargaining power
in the process. That is why Chile, from a mercantilist point of view, gained much more than
the other parties in the final Agreement. This sets a rather bad example for the other
potential members – if the P4 Agreement cannot even handle the pressure from a country
that is, at best, a regional power, how can it deal with the pressure from global powers such
as the United States and China? Until the parties to the Agreement can find a way to handle
the pressure from more powerful countries, it is better to keep the membership among
smaller open economies. Otherwise, the plague of protectionism will creep in and the P4
Agreement will degenerate into another ordinary spoke of a hub country.
Third, at the technical level, the Agreement provides the necessary elements and
mechanisms for making the regional preferences multilateral. One of the stated objectives of
the Agreement is to serve as a model FTA within the Asia-Pacific region and gradually
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expand to other countries in the region.26  In a way, this is similar to the concept of
“multilateralizing regionalism” as argued a seminal article by Baldwin (2006). In that article
as well as in a sequel by Baldwin, Evenett and Low (2009), the necessary elements and
mechanisms for multilateralizing both tariff and non-tariff commitments were discussed.
Unfortunately, few of these elements and mechanisms are featured in the P4 Agreement.
For example, the multilateralization of tariff preferences needs liberal ROOs and extended
cumulation rules. As discussed above, however, the ROO in the P4 Agreement is rather
restrictive and complicated, and only bilateral cumulation is allowed. Baldwin also noted that
the experiences of the Information Technology Agreement and Pan-European Cumulation
System have shown that the unbundling or fragmentation of offshoring to “spoke”
economies would create enough political economy forces to resolve the spaghetti bowl
problem.
In the case of the P4 Agreement, however, its members do not have a great deal of
intra-industry trade and it is unlikely that the same political economic forces will be found
forming within the four parties. While Chile and New Zealand share many similarities in the
agricultural sector, this will not lead to the same unbundling process as that seen in the
Pan-European Cumulation System; This is because agricultural products, unlike industrial
products, are generally not sent back and forth between different countries for processing
before the final product is produced. While the prospect for more intra-industry trade might
become more promising when more countries in East and South-East Asia join the P4
Agreement, it remains to be seen whether other countries in the region are actually
interested in joining. In the case of trade remedies, Baldwin (2006) called for (a) the
elimination of trade remedy measures or at least limited recourse to trade remedies through
mechanisms such as notification and consultation procedures, or (b) higher thresholds for
the initiation, investigation and application of these measures. Again, however, the P4
Agreement provides nothing useful in that area, as it merely affirms the rights and
obligations of the parties under the respective WTO Agreements.27
Compared to these areas, the trade in services chapter appears to be more
encouraging, as it offers both mechanisms suggested by Baldwin (2006), i.e., the “third
party” MFN clause and the “leaky” or liberal ROO. However, the potential effects of these
two provisions might be more limited than originally thought. First, as mentioned above, both
the MFN and Market Access clauses in the services chapter can be limited by the
reservations parties have scheduled in Annexes III and IV. This explains why many
concessions given by some of the parties to other countries (such as the United States)
cannot be found in the P4 Agreement. Second, the liberal ROO is also subject to the
limitations that the parties might impose on a service supplier pursuant to Article 12.12,
which authorizes denial of benefits to service suppliers under certain circumstances.
Overall, the P4 Agreement needs to be substantially revamped to make it friendlier to
multilateralization.
26 See the last sentence of the preamble to the P4 Agreement. See also the Overview on the P4
Agreement by New Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, available at www.mfat.govt.nz/
Trade-and-Economic-Relations/Trade-Agreements/Trans-Pacific/index.php.
27 Chapter Six in the P4 Agreement.
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In conclusion, contrary to the frequently-repeated rhetoric that the P4 Agreement is
a high-standard FTA, the author argues that it is not unusual. To achieve its stated goal of
becoming a stepping stone for wider trade liberalization efforts in the Asia-Pacific region, it
will need to revamp substantially both the market access and rules component of the
package to make it more attractive. Otherwise, the P4 Agreement might go down in trade
liberalization history as the “P-fail Agreement”.
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